VoterComp

This proposed voting process is conceptual. Political disagreement on this process will most probably occur to the point of making such a process difficult to enact and install. However, the process itself must be defined with explanation so it can be shown with transparency.

There are several factors defining the voting process. However, the one defining factor which must be adhered to is the absolute, unambiguous control of the entire process. This includes securing all manners of voting, integrating everything into a fully auditable, fully transparent method which cannot be misinterpreted or, more likely, criminally alterable.

It is sad that many people in this country view the tightening of voter controls as a violation of civil rights. This is precisely the reason in how the current system is not only broken but has led to an unfortunate situation where voter fraud is not only possible, but likely, given circumstances that heretofore have required institutional trust and cooperation between all actors. One major national party, with cooperation from non-political entities such as Internet tech giants, classical (mainstream) news media, entertainment media, academia, and a variety of anti-democratic groups have blatantly stolen elections with no recourse left to those who want to see fair, democratic outcomes in a Constitutional republic.

To that end, a voting process framework must perform a variety of vital functions that would pragmatically guarantee the votes of all qualified voters are valid, while ensuring that unqualified voters are not able to influence the outcome. In addition, the ability to present the results in a timely manner for (fair) media outlets to report highly accurate (but unofficial) results is another major requirement of this process. Finally, the most important requirement is to give the voter confidence that his vote was cast as to his actual selection, while knowing that no other fraudulent votes were injected to compromise the legal votes.

While the voting process includes all elements of voting, from voter registration, precinct voting identifiers, transmission of results, and chain of custody for official ballots, each function of the process will be defined in its own module. Important data definitions will be introduced in each explanation of the process as they occur through their modules. Again, many of the elements described automatically are repelled by the major national party, but without those elements, the voter process will remain inherently worthless, which is what the party wishes to maintain.

This proposed voting process is conceptual. Political disagreement on this process will most probably occur to the point of making such a process difficult to enact and install. However, the process itself must be defined with explanation so it can be shown with transparency.

There are several factors defining the voting process. However, the one defining factor which must be adhered to is the absolute, unambiguous control of the entire process. This includes securing all manners of voting, integrating everything into a fully auditable, fully transparent method which cannot be misinterpreted or, more likely, criminally alterable.

It is sad that many people in this country view the tightening of voter controls as a violation of civil rights. This is precisely the reason in how the current system is not only broken but has led to an unfortunate situation where voter fraud is not only possible, but likely, given circumstances that heretofore have required institutional trust and cooperation between all actors. One major national party, with cooperation from non-political entities such as Internet tech giants, classical (mainstream) news media, entertainment media, academia, and a variety of anti-democratic groups have blatantly stolen elections with no recourse left to those who want to see fair, democratic outcomes in a Constitutional republic.

To that end, a voting process framework must perform a variety of vital functions that would pragmatically guarantee the votes of all qualified voters are valid, while ensuring that unqualified voters are not able to influence the outcome. In addition, the ability to present the results in a timely manner for (fair) media outlets to report highly accurate (but unofficial) results is another major requirement of this process. Finally, the most important requirement is to give the voter confidence that his vote was cast as to his actual selection, while knowing that no other fraudulent votes were injected to compromise the legal votes.

While the voting process includes all elements of voting, from voter registration, precinct voting identifiers, transmission of results, and chain of custody for official ballots, each function of the process will be defined in its own module. Important data definitions will be introduced in each explanation of the process as they occur through their modules. Again, many of the elements described automatically are repelled by the major national party, but without those elements, the voter process will remain inherently worthless, which is what the party wishes to maintain.

Every voter must qualify to vote in the United States. The qualifications may differ between states subject to legal challenges in the judicial branch, but there are two Constitutional requirements: 1) Is one a citizen of the United States, and 2) is one of age (currently, 18) to vote? Before 2000, the answers were unambiguous. However, many states have allowed voters to vote in primaries prior to the age of 18 if they turned 18 by the general election date. In addition, many municipalities have authorized non-legal citizens to vote in their elections. Some have even allowed them to hold elective office.

Voter registration, at this point, will be defined in such a way that is slightly different than the current method of description, as this module pertains to the permanent voter identification. Keeping in mind most people move from one jurisdiction to another in both permanent and temporary manners, it is vital that individuals are assigned a unique identifier that they would use no matter which jurisdiction (state or precinct) in which they vote.

Current methodology incorporates registering in the precinct in which their primary residence is located, but there are usually no major processes in place to ensure current registration qualification. There are routinely deceased people or people have moved out of the jurisdiction, sometimes for decades, that show up year after year. The proposed method would incorporate checks to ensure that registration is valid only at legal jurisdictions.

Therefore, each voter, regardless of current residence, age, marital status, or other indicators that currently are a focal point for voter register rolls, will be assigned a permanent, unique Voter ID (VID) that will be assigned to him. This number is private, known only to the assigning agency as well as the voter.

An individual must provide the following information (as a minimum) to obtain his Voter ID: Name, current address (or non-domicile (homeless) status), and affidavits to his qualifications for age and citizenship status. Please note: The VID itself is NOT a physical document, as the VID is simply supplemental to actual registration in a specific election. (Affidavits, such as driver’s licenses or passports, are used in the process of validating a voter to obtain a VID.)

Finally, it must be noted: voter registration is voluntary. If a voter does not wish to remain on a voter registry for any reason, it is his right to do so. A voter may proactively remove his name and all related information from the voter database, verified by the registration clerk in his county either in person, or through registered USPS or authorized delivery or messenger service. Once deleted from the registry, the voter’s name will be severed, and the voter’s VID will be retired from use in any jurisdiction (if state compact is in effect). If a voter then wishes to reregister, then the voter will obtain a new VID.

All elections are assigned to their own ID, with their own rules pertinent to the election type. In addition, some voting jurisdictions authorize non-candidate-centric slates that include bond measures and other referendums. In some cases, an election may be part of an election cycle, which combines primary, general, and ancillary elections (runoff, etc.) related to the selection of the final winning candidate or non-candidate issue in the general election. In other cases, an election may be considered a “standalone” election, most notably to fill a vacated seat due to resignation or death of an officeholder, or in some cases, special state or municipal elections.

Each election cycle requires the Voter to register for each one. While various state or county Voter rolls contain the results of the past several election cycles for voters, a voter must register for each registration cycle by a designated date prior to the election, in accordance with state law. For federal elections, minimum standards must be applied pursuant to national defense statutes, which supersede 10^th amendment protocols. Currently some states automatically register individuals at the same time they get their driver’s license or state ID’s, which makes verification difficult. In addition, the driver’s license may not be obtained in time for the registration period for an election cycle.

(Commentary: “Motor voter,” presented as a “convenience,” in which individuals are automatically registered to vote while obtaining a driver’s license or state identification at their local motor vehicle bureau or department is a disastrous method of being able to register to vote, as in some states voter registration is required, like California. Coupled with the issue of driver’s licenses to illegal aliens, which in turn has resulted in provisional votes being counted in several close election races in California, there is no real method of countering this state requirement that is unfortunately being advanced in states beyond two-party political competition, such as California. However, for purposes of setting up the framework for registration purposes, motor voter will be temporarily removed from the process.)

A voter may register once for an election cycle, which will include all the elections within that cycle. A typical election cycle contains two elections: A Primary election, in which candidates of political parties vie for the nomination of their party, and the General election, in which the winners of the Primary and non-affiliated party candidates vie for the final determination. In addition, some states or municipalities may have requirements for runoff elections as well as minimum percentage requirements (usually, “50% + 1” clear majority) that can be added following either the Primary or the General election. Also in some jurisdictions, a “Jungle Primary” may replace the typical Party Primary, which allows all voters of all parties to run in the same Primary race, with the top two vote receivers running against each other in the General election.

If a registered voter changes his residence but stays within the jurisdiction, then he should be able to provide a simple address change at the jurisdiction voter registration office.

VoterComp can accommodate all these different requirements safely, securely, and quickly.

There are two scenarios for voting directly at the precinct. The first scenario is Early Voting, which is voting during designated voting periods prior to Election Day. The second scenario is voting on Election Day. Both scenarios contain identical steps through much of its process, with the major difference in the close-out procedure for the final voting period on Election Day.

This process will highlight the meticulous steps that a typical process will incur. Note that this process is illustrated for a properly registered voter, voting at his assigned precinct, and the corresponding actions taken by precinct officials to execute the voting process for the voter, as well as in maintaining due vigilance in the processing of the ballots and voting equipment. This paper only lists the basic steps within the process, including typical navigation on voting equipment and the strict control of ballots in general.

Precinct Security and Initial Setup

Before the precinct is open for the first day of voting during this election, the precinct manager must ensure that the precinct is completely secure.

Setup at the precinct

The setup entails four major sections. Each section is controlled by the Precinct Supervisor, along with his Precinct Voting Witnesses.

1. Voter Check-in/Checkout
2. Polling Booth
3. Ballot Submission Box
4. Precinct Data Controller

The voter checks in with the check-in/checkout clerk. The clerk identifies his name and checks him in, and a timestamp is applied to his name indicating time of check-in.

Next, the clerk gives the voter his ballot. This ballot is pre-printed with the voter’s name and (optional) address, along with the Ballot ID No. The clerk verifies that the voter has received the ballot, a timestamp is applied to the name indicating time of ballot submission.

NOTE: While the two processes can and usually will take place at the same time, each gets its own timestamp for auditing purposes. This will be explained in an alternate step involving missing or non-registered voters.

The ballot is not just a simple piece of paper. It contains the following:

1. The top sheet is made of a heavy-grade paper stock that cannot be seen through, and contains the voter’s name, the voter’s VoterID, the Ballot ID, directional arrows pointing to the top, along with a scan code containing the Ballot ID.
2. Two sheets in same sleeve that cannot be easily breached by hand and cannot be separated cleanly by hand (no perforations). Each sheet has a carbonless face, contains the actual voting information that will be printed by the ballot printer, and collectively comprise the OFFICIAL vote. This will be explained in the next process. The two sheets are of different colors: Light yellow and light red (pink).
3. A final sheet that is a copy of the other two sheets; however, this sheet is mounted on its own perforation sleeve that is easy to tear off the back. Its color is light green.

The voter goes into the voting booth, which contains the Voting Booth Device (VBU). (Information on initialization and operation of the Voting Booth Device is located in the appendix.)

This device consists of two IO’s: A touch screen and a ballot input tray.

The first process step highlights the screen (each step will be referred to “the screen”) welcomes the voter and instructs the voter to enter his ballot into the tray. After reading the scan code, the screen displays the voter’s name, address, and election title on the screen, along with the current date and time. The voter clicks ok. The left side of the screen shows the races in the slate, with the first item highlighted. The main screen shows the highlighted name of the race. The list of people running for that race are all shown on the screen. The order of the candidates is shown in random order, though there may be a “subset” of prioritized candidate groups, particularly for major parties. For instance, the Democratic and Republican candidates may be prioritized to show as either position 1 or position 2, randomized between those two positions for each voter, while the subsequent candidates are randomized between position 3 and the last position.

All candidates are shown by authorized Ballot name, their party (“unaffiliated” for all unaffiliated candidates), and their authorized campaign picture (if available). In addition, there are always two more choices: “Write-in candidate” or “No selection.” In virtually every circumstance, only one candidate or entry may be selected. One of the following steps will occur:

1. Selecting a candidate shown on the ballot: If one of the displayed candidates is shown, then a popup screen activates, which shows the race, candidate information, and picture, and the question, “Is [Candidate name] the candidate that you selected for [office]?”
   1. If “Yes” is selected, then the selected candidate is applied to the race, and the next race or issue in the slate appears with its list of candidates or the issue to vote for.
   2. If “No” is selected, then the screen reverts to the original selection screen for this race.
2. Selecting “Write-in candidate”: A new screen is shown which depicts an on-screen keyboard. The voter now types in the name of the write-in candidate. This is followed by the popup screen activation, with the question, “Is [Candidate name] the candidate that you selected for [office]?” In addition, a disclaimer may be indicated to state that only candidates who are qualified for the position may actually receive the vote, otherwise the vote is disqualified.
   1. If “Yes” is selected, then the selected candidate is applied to the race, and the next race or issue in the slate appears with its list of candidates or the issue to vote for.
   2. If “No” is selected, then the screen reverts to the original selection screen for this race.
3. If “No selection” is selected, then a popup screen activates, which shows the race and the question, “Are you sure you wish to skip this race?”
   1. If “Yes” is selected, then a popup activates, displaying “The race for the office of [race type] will be skipped,” and the next race or issue in the slate appears with its list of candidates or the issue to vote for.
   2. If “No” is selected, then the screen reverts to the original selection screen for this race.

Once the slate is completed, the complete list is presented to the voter in the final screen, in order of the races on the slate, along with the selection by the voter. The voter is given one more opportunity to change his vote on any of the issues. This is done by selecting the candidate or issue he wishes to change. After selecting it, that selected race will show up with the list of candidates, with his current selection highlighted on the screen. After the voter changes his selection and confirming the popup message indicating his new candidate selection, his write-in keyboard screen if he elects to select a write-in candidate, or “No Selection” if he decides not to vote on that race, the screen reverts to the final confirmation screen. Once the voter finishes the confirmation process, he clicks “OK.”

At this time, the ballot is printed. Once the printing is finished, the screen notifies the voter to remove the ballot. After removing the ballot from the slot, the screen tells the voter to remove the last page from the ballot, informing the voter to either keep the copy for his records or own use (advising to pocket or fold it to keep it secure from prying eyes), or to shred it before leaving the precinct at the shredding machine by the check-in/checkout table. The last question the screen asks if the final page was removed from the ballot, after which the machine defaults to its idle position. (Note: the ballot sheet will only have the voter ID on it to identify the voter, as well as the Vote Transaction ID to identify the actual vote transaction. No other personal information is shown to ensure immediate association with an individual and his vote selections.)

The voter returns to check-in. The voter removes the back copy of the ballot. If the voter has not removed the back copy, the clerk reminds him. Once he removes the copy, the clerk takes the ballot and enters it into the Verified Registered Voter Ballot Receptable. Note that the ballot will not be able to enter the machine without the removal of the green copy. The BR prints and dispenses a confirmation receipt for the voter, after which the clerk completes the checkout process with the voter. The receipt contains the Vote Transaction ID number, Vote Transaction Type (ID), the date, time sequence, and precinct. The voter should keep this for future confirmation of his particular vote, including the ability to look up the actual vote at the regional precinct office (explained later).

At official closing time, if there is anyone waiting in line, they are given an Extended Voting Time marker. This indicates that these voters are authorized to vote, and timestamped, after official closing hours, and allowed to vote during the Extended Voting Time period. Each marker has its own ID, and must be entered at check-in and check-out, to indicate that the voter had legally voted. In addition, the ballots must be entered into the check-in/check-out machine by the Supervisor or his immediate delegate, using the password each time a ballot is entered to ensure the integrity of the late entry. This ensures that subsequent additions to the Ballot Receptable are accounted for on a voter-by-voter basis.

Note: The following process only applies to single-day voting election sessions. For multiple-day voting, see next section.

At Close of Final Election Day Voting Session

Once the final voter has checked out, the Precinct Manager takes the Initial Vote Corroborative Device (IVCD) to close out, in order: The Check-in/Checkout stations, the Ballot Receptables, and each Voting Booth Device. Keep in mind there is no actual ability for any of the devices to transmit or expose data, other than through the IVCD, while the devices are under precinct control.

First, the Precinct Manager starts the closeout process on the main computer serving the Check-in/Checkout stations. He inserts the IVCD into the machine, then checks the display to verify that all voters who checked in, also checked out with competed ballot submissions. If the verification is positive, the PM writes his initials onto the IVCD and removes the device from the check-in/checkout station. The CI-CO machines and terminals are now deactivated. An emergency process to reactivate them is discussed later.

Next, he inserts the IVCD into the Verified Registered Voter Ballot Receptable. The IVCD checks the voter ID’s and Ballot ID’s against the entries made from the CI-CO data. If they match (as they always should), the PM writes his initials into the IVCD. Note that this receptable contains the OFFICIAL verified ballots of record. At this point, the Receptable is officially closed for new ballots, and its process transforms to “awaiting first stage of ballot verification” as its contents inside awaiting to be processed.

Next, he inserts the IVCD into the Provisional Voter Ballot Receptable. The IVCD checks the voter ID’s and Ballot ID’s against the entries made from the CI-CO data. If they match (as they always should), the PM writes his initials into the IVCD. At this point, these ballots are provisional and the Receptable is officially closed for new ballots, and its process transforms to the first state of ballot verification as its contents inside awaiting to be processed through the Provisional Voter Verification Process at the regional location before the ballots are either officially counted or officially rejected.

Finally, he goes to each polling booth machine, takes off the panel, inputs the password to unlock the port, then inserts the IVCD into the machines. All Ballot ID’s and Voter ID’s must cumulatively match all polling booth machines. Once that is verified, the PM initials the results of the IVCD. Note that all voting data is being transferred onto the IVCD from each machine.

At this point, the voting booth machines are not only shut off, but they are also completely deactivated from further use, their data transferred onto the internal firmware for verification purposes within the statutory period before being completely re-initialized for future use.

Once everything is deactivated, the IVCD is taken to the Precinct Control Unit (PCU) and inserted into the port. The IVCD contains this information (all public unless otherwise noted):

1. Count of all registered voters
2. Count of all provisional voters
3. Timestamps of all voters of the following:
   1. Check-in
   2. Ballot acceptance
   3. Insertion of ballot into Voting Booth Device
   4. Acceptance of voting rules
   5. Corroboration that all votes have been correctly entered
   6. Removal of ballot from Voting Booth Device
   7. Removal of last sheet on ballot
   8. Ballot submission
   9. Checkout

NOTE: Each step must corroborate with other steps as relevant. In additions, some timestamps my indicate simultaneous actions above, providing they are in sequence.

• Total votes for each race on slate
  • Votes from verified voters
  • Votes from provisional voters
• Total votes for each candidate in each race, or non-candidate referendums
  • Votes from verified voters
  • Votes from provisional voters
• Total votes for each race on each voting booth device
  • Votes from verified voters
  • Votes from provisional voters
• Total votes for each candidate on each voting booth device
  • Votes from verified voters
  • Votes from provisional voters
• Total ballots entered into verified voter ballot box
• Total ballots entered into provisional voter ballot box

During each step of the process above, each step must match up with previous process steps when relevant. For instance, all counts for ballots in verified voter ballot box must match the counts for all verified voter check-ins, as well as cumulative total of verified voters in each voting booth device. Verification accuracy can be calibrated, as necessary.

Once all verification steps are completed, the following power-down sequence must be performed:

1. Power down of each voting booth
   1. Removal of power cord from power supply
   2. Locking power switch connector
   3. Applying warranty seal and initialing its application by the PM
2. Power down verified voter ballot box
   1. Removal of power cord from power supply
   2. Locking power switch connector
   3. Applying warranty seal and initialing its application by the PM
3. Power down provisional voter ballot box
   1. Removal of power cord from power supply
   2. Locking power switch connector
   3. Applying warranty seal and initialing its application by the PM
4. Power down check-in/checkout station boxes
   1. Removal of power cord from power supply
   2. Removal of connecting cables to main Precinct Control Unit
   3. Locking power switch connector
   4. Applying warranty seal and initialing its application by the PM

Once all steps have been performed, all devices must be placed into the Transport Crate and locked BUT NOT SEALED, and the Transport Crate must remain out of public access zones.

Creation and Distribution of Voter Information statistics

This process may be open to revision. For now, the following sequences must be followed.

1. The IVCD must print all reports derived from the IVCD, making three copies, making one set of copies at a time. The sets of the copies are as follows:
   1. One set for the State Voting Control location under direct auspices of the Voter Registrar for the state
   2. One set to accompany the voting equipment in the Transport Crate
   3. One set to remain in the precinct safe
2. The set for the SVC will be inserted into a pre-addressed insured, registered mail packet to take to the USPS branch when it is open in the morning, and places it into the Precinct Safe. This set will be sent to the State Voting Control location under direct auspices of the Voter Registrar for the state.
3. The next set will be signed off and placed into an envelope that will accompany the devices in the Transport Crate.
4. The last set of copies will remain in the Precinct Safe until the State Registrar validates the election, usually in the following month, after which the copy should be filed within a local official government office (city, county), in a controlled, but unclassified (FOIA request-enabled) status.

Once these steps are finished, then the transmission of the voting results can be processed.

Transmission of Voting Results

It must be duly noted that at no time was any device or apparatus connected to the Internet or outside digital network, either through hard wire (ethernet cable) or through wireless means. In addition, all machines are constructed with military-grade RF technology that precludes interception of electronic data transmission through leakage. Now that all devices and other apparatus are properly decommissioned, the transmission of results can be performed. The IVCD should still be inserted into the machine, so the following sequence should be performed by the PM:

1. Press Ctl+Alt+Del (control-alternate-delete) keys to bring up the special menu.
2. The menu will show a screen that will inform the PM to connect the Internet cable.
3. The PM physically connects the cable. (It should be noted that the computer does not work on a commercial or conventional operating system but is a system specifically created for precinct purposes.)
4. Once the computer determines the Internet is connected, it displays the precinct number, the Precinct Manager, and a password box. The PM puts in his designated Precinct password.
5. Once the activation is done, the State office is notified. Once notification is acknowledged, another password box appears. This will be the encrypted password for transmission. NOTE: Telephonic contact may or may not be made between the Precinct Manager and the Regional or State office representative, but not necessary in this process (although it would probably be a good verification component).
6. The PM enters the password into the box.
7. Once confirmation of the password is accepted, the PM is prompted with the “Ready to Send” message.
8. The PM presses the Send button. The data is sent through highly encrypted means to be determined.
9. Once the data is sent, the PM is notified, and prints three copies of the acknowledgement for successful transmission.
10. Once signed by the PM, the reports are processed as follows:
    1. One report is included in the envelope addressed for the State Voting Control location
    2. One report is included in the Transport Crate
    3. One report is left in the Precinct Safe until the State certifies the votes in the following weeks.

The reports are now ready for distribution. This method is explained in the section “Electronic Results Processing and Public Release” below.

Precinct Closure

Once all the reports are sent, the Precinct Manager unlocks the Transport Crate and performs the final inventory check. After signing off on it, he includes all accompanying documentation, and locks the crate with the lock. After locking, he puts on the tamperproof seal that will be verified upon receipt at the regional or state voting location. At this time, he turns the security of the crate over to the service contracted for the Ballot Security, Possession and Transport Authority.

Transport and disposition of Transport Crates

Transport Crates will be transported by BSPTA agents as securely as any financial or legal documents are done. Ideally, armored trucks will be purposed for this detail, with all top security procedures (Ground-based GPS control, contracted police escorts, etc.) in place as deemed appropriate.

Regional Ballot Certification facilities are designated to control all ballots, including secure temporary storage, highly monitored vote-counting tasks, and 100% audit trails.

Once all crates have been received and signed for by the Regional Manager or his authorized delegate, he removes the ballot receptacles from the crates. They are signed off the crate. All other equipment in the crates is also inventoried and signed off but stay in the crates. Once all items are in order, the crates are sealed and taken to their hibernation chamber, awaiting recalibration and assignments for their next use.

The ballot receptacles, once removed, stay together throughout the rest of the process within their own precinct. There will be two, three, or more receptacles per precinct which must be physically secured at all times.

At the state level, the State Voter Registrar authorized delegates obtain all the data that was successfully transmitted from each precinct. The ERPPR process consists of extracting all voter selections in each race in two categories: Verified Voters and Provisional Voters. The data is transferred from the individual Precinct transmissions into the State database of all races, including all votes for all candidates from each race. The transfer should literally take seconds to transfer the data.

Ideally, all dissemination of voter derived from the State Voter Registrar database shall be a simple release of all races of both verified and unverified (provisional) voters from each precinct. This will allow for full disclosure, as well as the ability to provide transparency into each precinct’s performance as well as various vote methods used. All races can be derived from the State database once the authorized transmissions are received from the precincts. In addition, it makes it impossible for “vote harvesting” to flourish, in that Election Day (the final day a voter can vote) will have already accounted for every ballot that was distributed, as there is a hard count on those numbers that must be in the system.

It should be noted that all results derived from the transmissions are UNOFFICIAL. Remember, the official count will only occur once all ballots are counted by hand in the process to be defined later. However, for Election Night reporting, the summary data will provide the results for immediate review.

Between Election Day and the official State Vote Certification deadline, all ballots will undergo a full, unambiguously transparent counting process that will incorporate a full, verified count. This process may take several days, or longer if a recount is necessary, but its systematic, straightforward process ensures a near-bulletproof auditing protocol.

Brief Recap

It must be noted that using present voting protocols, the official count is (ostensibly) done with official ballot counters, counting and tallying the current ballots for all races, mostly on Election Night. So while the current process is technically faster than the new process as far as PHYSICALLY counting the ballots, the virtually foolproof method will necessarily take a few days. As stated before, the media release using the new system is going to reflect realtime machine counts derived from the precinct submissions of the actual voting, while the official counts in this secion will provide the official ballot vote result.

While most races will usually show a well-determinate result, such as 55% of the vote in a voting pool of 500,000, there isn’t that great a need to count those ballots on an immediate basis. But if the race is extremely close, usually within 0.5%, then the process explained below can be scaled upward to facilitate the result of the close election.

Setup

1. A Counting Team will be assigned to the process of counting all ballots for each precinct. The Counting Team consists of a group of counting pairs, not to exceed ten pairs per precinct. Each counting pair will consist of one member each from the Democratic and Republican parties (or Independent if either the Democratic or Republican party is outnumbered in state voter registrations). Finally, a Ballot Certification supervisor and an optional, credentialed assistant will control the ballot receptacles, distribution of the ballots, and oversee the operation for each precinct.
2. Each counting pair will be separated into their own station during the counting process.
3. The only other people allowed in the rooms or cubicle zones during the counting process, other than the above individuals and the Ballot Certification supervisor, are those ordered by judicial order, such as legal representatives, which are typically required in recounts.
4. The equipment in each counting room consists of the following equipment for each precinct:
   1. The mail-in ballot container of voters from the precinct being counted
   2. The Verified Registered Voter Ballot Receptacle
   3. The Provisional Voter Ballot Receptacle
   4. The Damaged Voter Ballot Receptacle
   5. Overhead station camera that records the entire process
   6. The Controller that starts / stops the initial time for the current ballot counting process
   7. Official Ballot Scanner / Imager that records each ballot and count at each station
   8. Pad to place ballot to register visual record under the BSI
   9. Return receptacle to place the Verified and Provisional ballots once counted and verified
   10. Return receptacle to place the Verified and Provisional ballots with conflictive results
   11. Return receptacle to place the Absentee ballots once counted and verified
   12. Return receptacle to place the Absentee ballots with conflictive results

Process

Counting of ballots is done in a similar, but more systematic matter with accountability both through automated as well as manual interaction. In addition, rather than one counter, there are two credentialed counters who are from the two most significant parties of the state, typically the Republican Party and the Democratic Party.

Part 1: Preparation and Initial Distribution

1. The supervisor starts the overhead camera feeds for each station, ensuring each feed is running correctly.
2. The supervisor secures the container of mail-in ballots for the precinct. In addition, the supervisor secures the Verified Register Voter Ballot Receptacle (Rec. 1), and the Provisional Voter Ballot Receptible (Rec. 2).  
3. The supervisor takes the container to his control room or area, which will always remain secure with no access except by the supervisor and his authorized delegate.
4. The supervisor obtains the printouts for each receptible, including each ballot count.
5. The supervisor powers up Rec. 1.
6. The supervisor enters his password onto the screen, and verifies that the votes are to be counted, and that Rec. 1 is in the secure counting area.
7. The machine provides a code onto the screen.
8. The supervisor enters the code into his computer station, where the Regional Manager authorizes the counting process and provides a counter-code.
9. The machine accepts the counter-code and authorizes the machine to be opened.
10. The supervisor opens the machine and removes the ballot stacker
11. The supervisor removes the ballots from the ballot stacker.
12. The supervisor creates groups of 25 ballots from the stack.
13. The supervisor distributes the 25-ballot groups to each counting team by taking them to each group, ensuring the security of the counting room prior to distribution.

Part 2: Counting of the Ballots

1. One of the counting team members (Counter A) receives the ballot group.
2. One of the counting team members clicks the “start process camera feed” button on the Controller. This allows the camera feed to start recording from time the button was clicked.
3. Counter A takes the first ballot from the group and cuts off the perforated line.
4. For regular ballots, Counter A folds back the ballot, breaking the seal and exposes the Ballot Slate. For absentee ballots, Counter A opens the ballot envelope and removes the ballot.
5. Counter A places the ballot onto the image scanner pad.
6. Counter A presses the scan button, where the imager processes the information and timestamps the video image with the ballot ID.
7. The image is shown on the counting pair area screen.
8. Counter A removes the ballot from the pad.
9. Counter A types in his PIN into the keyboard, which will prompt “Counter A ready to process Ballot ID (number).”
10. Example:
    Counter A: Race 1, Selection B, (Mayor, Jane Smith)
11. Counter A will repeat Step 10 for each race.
12. Once finished, Counter A clicks “Complete” on the keyboard and hands the ballot to Counter B.
13. Counter B recites the Race Number and the Candidate Selection Letter from the ballot into his microphone.
14. The machine transcribes the spoken audio into text, which should match Counter B’s recitation.
15. The screen shows “Counter B: Race (Number), Selection (Letter), (Race Text, Selection Text).
16. Counter B will repeat Step 8 for each race, with the screen indicating “Counter B.”
17. Once finished, Counter B clicks “Complete” on the keyboard.
18. If the screen displays, “Vote verified,” then one of the counters will place a sticker saying “Official” on the bottom on the ballot. Next, the ballot will be placed in the “Verified” ballot bin. Continue to the next ballot, or if last ballot, then to the Count Finish.
19. If the screen displays a warning “Ballot not verified. Resolve conflict,” and will provide the reason for the conflict. Conflict will most probably involve differences in reporting race results between the two counters. The race with the conflict will be shown, as well as the original result recorded on voting day.
20. If one of the counters match the original count, then the second counter will repeat the process. If he still feels there is a conflict, the two counters will discuss the ballot between themselves. If the discussion cannot be resolved, then one of the counters will enter the reason into the keyboard, place a sticker saying “Conflict” onto the ballot, and place the ballot into the “Unverified” ballot bin. Otherwise, if his recount matches both the other counter as well as the original count, then the screen will indicate “Ballot verified.” Each counter will enter their PIN into the screen. After placing a sticker saying “Official” on the bottom of the ballot, the counter will place the ballot placed into the Verified receptacle. For documentation purposes, the counter who initiated the original conflict will enter his pin number.
21. If both counters match each other’s count, but doesn’t match the original count, then each counter will repeat the process. If this process continues to match each other but not match the original count, one of the counters will place a sticker saying “Conflict” onto the ballot and place the ballot into “Unverified” ballot bin.” Both counters will be prompted to enter their PIN numbers to signify the conflict.
22. If the highly unlikely event that a ballot is damaged and cannot obviously be read, then the ballot would be placed into a “Damaged” envelope for safekeeping, with the Ballot ID written on the indicator line.
23. The damaged ballots, within their envelopes, are placed into the “Damaged” ballot bin.
24. Once counts are finished, a message is sent to the Supervisor to come get the ballots to take back to the control room.
25. Once the Supervisor retrieves the ballots, the camera on the Controller is pressed to provide the stopping time for the process. This recording file will be saved in a process folder in the Supervisor’s office.

Part 3: Supervisor Confirmation

1. Before retrieving ballots that have been counted, the supervisor prepares the Ballot Archive scanner and the boxes that will store the ballots.
2. The supervisor stacks the ballots retrieved from the Counting Teams separated into seven groups:
   1. Verified Ballots marked “Official”
   2. Provisional Ballots marked “Official”
   3. Verified Ballots marked “Conflict”
   4. Provisional Ballots marked “Conflict”
   5. Absentee Ballots marked “Official”
   6. Absentee Ballots marked “Conflict”
   7. All ballots marked “Damaged”
3. The supervisor takes the first ballot from the group containing the Verified Ballots marked “Official,” ensuring that the “Official” sticker is on the ballot.
4. The supervisor scans the ballot, ensuring the Ballot ID is identified. The computer will instantly verify the count by the Counting team.
5. Once the verification signal comes from the computer, the supervisor places the ballot into the Verified ballot box, and presses “OK” on the computer.
6. The supervisor repeats Steps 3 through 5 until he is finished with the group containing the Verified Ballots marked “Official.”
7. Next, the supervisor takes the first ballot from the group containing the Provisional Ballots marked “Official,” ensuring that the “Official” sticker is on the ballot.
8. The supervisor scans the ballot, ensuring the Ballot ID is identified. The computer will instantly verify the count by the Counting team.
9. Once the verification signal comes from the computer, the supervisor places the ballot into the Provisional ballot box, and presses “OK” on the computer.
10. The supervisor repeats Steps 7 through 9 until he is finished with the group containing the Provisional Ballots marked “Official.”
11. Next, the supervisor takes the first ballot from the group containing the Absentee Ballots marked “Official,” ensuring that the “Official” sticker is on the ballot.
12. The supervisor scans the ballot, ensuring the Ballot ID is identified. The computer will instantly verify the count by the Counting team.
13. Once the verification signal comes from the computer, the supervisor places the ballot into the Absentee ballot box, and presses “OK” on the computer.